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This Article reflects on some of the Court's most important separation
of powers cases, focusing primarily on the recent challenge to the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act resolved by the Supreme Court in Bow-
sher v. Synar. Much of the debate in this area has centered on the
proper judicial emphasis on formalist as opposed to functionalist meth-
odologies. This Article criticizes the standard functionalist approach
without adopting formalism.
The tendency of generals to prepare to fight the previous
war has been widely remarked. In the area of the constitu-
tional separation of powers, the Supreme Court's majority is
not completely immune from the same strategic disorder.
In its most recent significant separation of powers case, Bow-
sher v. Synar,' the Court intoned gravely that
[n]o one can doubt that Congress and the President are con-
fronted with fiscal and economic problems of unprecedented
magnitude, but "the fact that a given law or procedure is effi-
cient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of gov-
ernment, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the
Constitution. ' 2
The crux of the problem posed by Bowsher v. Synar, how-
ever, was not the contemporary equivalent of that posed by
such leading separation of powers cases as the Truman-era
steel seizure case, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.3
President Truman's alleged desire to in effect legislate, as
opposed to execute congressional statutes, in order to pro-
mote the uninterrupted flow of steel production during the
Korean War, rightfully calls for the response quoted above
in Bowsher. But Bowsher v. Synar, in which the Court struck
* Associate Professor of Law, Cumberland School of Law. A.B. 1972, University
of Virginia; M.A. 1974, Ph.D. 1976, J.D. 1982, Indiana University.
1 106 S. Ct, 3181 (1986).
2 Id. at 3193-94 (quoting Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919, 944 (1983)).
3 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
CUMBERLAND LA W REVIEW
down crucial provisions of the Gramm-Rudman budget-bal-
ancing statute4 as violative of the separation of powers, is
not a case in which a coordinate branch, panicky over the"unprecedented magnitude" of a problem, tyrannously, or
potentially tyrannously, intruded in a classically "ambi-
tious" 5 way on the proper domain of another branch of
government.
Gramm-Rudman did not constitute an ambitious seizure
of power or "encroachment" by Congress, in such a way as
to pose an eventual threat to the liberties of citizens.
Gramm-Rudman is more plausibly analyzed as an act of con-
gressional abnegation of congressional responsibilities, or
at the very least, an ingenious, theoretically well-reasoned
congressional attempt at a sort of self-restraint. Similarly,
Gramm-Rudman is not most illuminatingly viewed as re-
flecting congressional concern over the "magnitude" of the
budget deficit problem, or the budget deficit's status as a
national emergency requiring an immediate response. In-
stead, Gramm-Rudman is most usefully viewed as a creative,
if experimental, response to a "deep" problem in the nature
of representative democracy and budgeting in the modern
welfare state itself. The problem is arguably resistant over
time to ordinary electoral and congressional voting
processes, despite the sincere preferences of Congress and
the electorate. What is disturbing about Bowsher is that
these observations about Gramm-Rudman were not con-
fronted on their own ground, or even expressly noted by the
Court.6 This Article addresses these important concerns
4 Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1038 (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 901-922 (Supp.
1986)).
5 See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 347 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). See also
Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches To Separation-of-Powers Questions - A Foolish
Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 488-89 (1987) (reporting that the Supreme
Court in Bowsher viewed the Gramm-Rudman statute as an expansion of congres-
sional power at the expense of the President, but also characterizing Gramm-Rud-
man as a congressional attempt at self-discipline).
6 This may partially reflect the superficially reassuring, but ultimately disquieting,
predominant emphasis on formalism in the Court's analysis. See Bowsher v. Synar,
106 S. Ct. at 3205 (White, J., dissenting); see also the case review of Bowsher in The
Supreme Court, 1985 Term- Leading Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 100, 221-30 (1986). To
the extent that formalism is a matter of ignoring actual or predicted real-world conse-
quences of the statute, the Court's emphasis on formalism may be partly attributable
to the expedited judicial resolution of the controversy, which ran from the presiden-
tial signature of the Gramm-Rudman Act on December 12, 1985 to the Court's deci-
sion on the following July 7.
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that were ignored in the Bowsher opinion itself.7
I. THE COURT'S DECISION IN BOWSHER V. SYNAR
The Gramm-Rudman Act, a federal budget deficit control
technique, required roughly across-the-board reductions in
federal spending programs in the years 1986 to 1991 if Con-
gress was not able, through the ordinary appropriations
process, to make continual progress in reducing the federal
deficit. The crucial provision, section 251 of the Act, re-
quired the Office of Management and Budget and the Con-
gressional Budget Office to submit their estimates of the
impending deficit, and the correspondingly necessary
budget reductions, along the general lines established by
Congress, to the Comptroller General. Under section 251
of the Act, the Comptroller General then presents his analy-
sis to the President, who is then required to issue an order
mandating the spending reductions specified by the Comp-
troller General, unless Congress itself intervenes with suffi-
cient spending reductions.
The Supreme Court held this crucial provision violative of
the separation of powers on the grounds that the Act con-
templated the exercise of independent judgment and ulti-
mate executive authority by the Comptroller General, who
is removable only by Congress. The Court concluded that
the Comptroller General, as an officer subject to the control
preeminently of the legislative branch, may not constitution-
ally exercise powers that are essentially executive in charac-
ter. Congress may not reserve for itself control over the
execution of the laws. 8
The Court's analysis was thus essentially what would have
been expected and appropriate for an "inverse" steel
seizure case. 9 Congress, on this view, overreacted to a per-
ceived crisis, or problem of great "magnitude,"' 0 by "ambi-
tiously"1  seizing presidential or executive branch
7 The three-judge district court that issued the original opinion in the case also
omitted any reference to the issues addressed in this Article. See generally Synar v.
United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374 (D.D.C. 1986)(Scalia, Johnson, & Gasch, JJ.), aff'd
sub noma. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986).
8 Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3188.
9 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). See also supra
text accompanying note 3.
10 See supra text accompanying note 2.
I1 See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 5.
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prerogatives. This analysis is, however, unreflective of the
evident intent and motivation of Congress, and unrespon-
sive to the nature of the underlying problem perceived by
Congress.
II. BOWSHER AND THE PURPOSES OF THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS
The separation of powers doctrine is not a mysterious to-
tem that, if ritualistically invoked, will protect us from harm.
It is a functional doctrine, designed to accomplish, or dis-
courage, particular states of affairs. A Supreme Court opin-
ion devoted to the separation of powers should, while
striving for the strength of simplicity,12 at least summarily
link its analysis to the prospect of avoiding the evils that the
separation of powers is intended or thought to discourage.
Dean Edward Levi observed on this score that the separa-
tion of powers doctrine "was based upon the skeptical idea
that only the division of power among three government in-
stitutions . . . could counteract the inevitable tendency of
concentrated authority to overreach and threaten liberty."' 3
Robert Dahl has stated more succinctly that the primary
Madisonian concern in the context of the separation of pow-
ers focuses on the prevention of "tyranny."' 4 Sometimes,
an emphasis not only on the value of political liberty, but on
the framers' antipathy to the exercise of arbitrary power is
added. 15
The chief explanation for this understanding of the sepa-
ration of powers role has recently been stated as follows:
[T]he Framers of the Constitution were not trying to create a
government that would discern national goals and serve them
efficiently and with dispatch; they were trying to create a lim-
ited government that would serve only those goals that could
survive a process of consultation and bargaining designed to
prevent the mischief of factions and the tyranny of passionate
majorities or ambitious politicians. 16
12 See generally in another context Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First
Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449 (1985) (discussing the practical virtues of simple,
easily understood decisions in first amendment adjudication).
13 Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 371, 374 (1976).
14 See R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOcRATIc THEORY 6 (1956).
15 See M. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 14 (1967).
16 Wilson, Does the Separation of Powers Still Work?, 86 PUB. INTEREST 36, 43 (1987).
Professor Currie subscribes to the liberty/avoidance-of-tyranny rationale for the sep-
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A similar functional account may apply to the related doc-
trine of checks and balances. Checks and balances as a doc-
trine does imply a departure from a pure division of
governmental labor and from a complete autonomous isola-
tion of governmental powers or functions. But checks and
balances mechanisms such as the President's participation in
the legislative process through the veto device contribute to
the same general end as separation of powers. As Professor
Peter Strauss has described the intent of the framers,
"[i]nterpenetration of function and competition among the
branches would protect liberty by preventing the irrevers-
ible accretion of ultimate power in any one."' 17
Professor Strauss quotes James Madison as considering
the essence of checks and balances to lie in " 'giving to
those who administer each department the necessary consti-
tutional means and personal motives to resist encroach-
ments of the others.' "18 Like the separation of powers, the
checks and balances doctrine is intended "to protect the citi-
zens from the emergence of tyrannical government by es-
tablishing multiple heads of authority in government, which
are then pitted one against another in a continuous strug-
gle,"' 19 in which ambition is made to counteract ambition.
There are broader theories of the purposes or functions
of the separation of powers; perhaps the most expansive
treatment concludes that
the separation of powers has been urged (1) to create greater
governmental efficiency; (2) to assure that statutory law is
made in the common interest; (3) to assure that the law is im-
partially administered and that all administrators are under
the law; (4) to allow the people's representatives to call execu-
aration of powers, yet concludes that "Bowsher should ... have come out the same
way if authority to administer the budget law had been given to an officer independ-
ent of congressional as well as Presidential control." Currie, The Distribution of Powers
After Bowsher, 1986 Sup. CT. REV. 19, 23, 26 (P. Kurland, G. Casper & D. Hutchinson
eds. 1987). For further argument generally along similar lines, see Miller, Independent
Agencies, in id. at 41, 52-58.
17 Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth
Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 603 (1984).
18 Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 321-22 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed.
1961)). See also Chemerinsky, A Paradox Without a Principle: A Comment on the Burger
Court's Jurisprudence in Separation of Powers Cases, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 1083, 1108 (1987)
(the "real" separation of powers issue as whether "one branch of government [is]
usurping the powers of another").
19 Strauss, supra note 17, at 578.
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tive officials to account for the abuse of their power; and (5) to
establish a balance of governmental powers. 20
It is of course possible to quibble with such a broad state-
ment of the separation of powers doctrine. Granted, the
separation of powers may in some respects conduce to gov-
ernmental efficiency, as, for example, in providing for cen-
tralized authority to negotiate treaties in the person of the
President. It is difficult, however, to make a broader case
for the day-to-day greater operational efficiency of sepa-
rated powers of government.2 '
Such a broad statement of the purposes of the separation
of powers introduces interesting complications, though, in
that it becomes possible to suggest that certain arrange-
ments and practices struck down by the Court as violative of
the separation of powers in fact tend, in some respects, to
affirmatively promote the doctrine's aims. One could easily
argue, for example, that the principal intent of the legisla-
tive veto mechanisms struck down in Immigration & Naturali-
zation Service v. Chadha22  was precisely to restore or
reestablish a "balance of governmental powers" for the
modern era of the administrative state.23
The Court's disinclination in Bowsher v. Synar to adopt
anything approaching legal realism was clearly presaged in
Chadha.24 Chadha involved a challenge to a provision25 of
the Immigration and Nationality Act that allowed either
house of Congress, without the concurrence of the other
house or presentment to the President, to in effect overrule
the Attorney General's decision to suspend the judicial de-
20 W. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 127-28 (1965).
21 See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 16, at 38-43. An efficiency argument can be made to
the effect that "the framers created a separate executive so that compromises, which
were unavoidable in the legislative process, would not carry over into the administra-
tive process and hobble it." Robinson, The Renewal of American Constitutionalism, in
SEPARATION OF POWERS: DOES IT STILL WORK?, 38, 48 (R. Goldwin & A. Kaufman
eds. 1986). While we would welcome an efficiency argument for the separation of
powers, the better to uphold the Gramm-Rudman experiment, in the modem inter-
est-group state, separation of powers between the legislative and executive may in-
troduce inefficiencies by allowing disappointed interest groups a separate,
independent chance at forestalling at the executive level what they have nominally
been saddled with after a previous battle at the legislative stage.
22 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
23 Id. at 967 (White, J., dissenting).
24 Id. at 919.
25 66 Stat. 216, (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1982)).
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portation of an otherwise deportable alien. 26 Chadha had
overstayed his nonimmigrant student visa and was ordered
to show cause why he should not be deported. 27 He applied
for a suspension of the deportation proceedings to an Immi-
gration Judge, who granted the request 28 and transmitted a
report of the suspension to Congress. 29 The House of Rep-
resentatives, however, without debate on the matter or a re-
corded vote,3 0 passed a resolution that effectively vetoed the
Attorney General's suspension of the deportation proceed-
ings of six aliens, including Chadha.3' Chadha raised the is-
sue of the constitutionality of such a "one-house legislative
veto."3 2
The Supreme Court struck down the exercise of this"veto" on separation of powers grounds. The Court found
the resolution by the House of Representatives to be "es-
sentially legislative in purpose and effect." 33 As such, it was
subject to the Article I requirements of Senate concur-
rence3 4 and presentment of the legislation to the President
for signature or veto.3 5 These requirements were not com-
plied with, 36 and none of the constitutionally specified ex-
ceptions to bicameralism and presentment were relevant3 7
The House Resolution was therefore constitutionally invalid
on separation of powers grounds.38
26 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 923.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 924.
29 Id. The Attorney General acted in this regard through the Immigration and
Naturalization Service of the Department of Justice.
30 Id. at 927.
31 Id. at 926-27.
32 Id. at 928.
33 Id. at 952. However, Justice Powell cogently argued that Congress had instead
improperly sought to adjudicate the status of Chadha, after the fashion of a court,
rather than to legislate a broadly applicable rule. See id. at 960 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
34 Id. at 945 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2).
35 Id. at 945-46.
36 Id. at 927-28.
37 Id. at 955-56.
38 For some of the leading general commentary on the result in Chadha, see
Breyer, The Legislative Veto After Chadha, 72 GEo. L.J. 785 (1984); Elliott, INS v.
Chadha: The Administrative Constitution, the Constitution, and the Legislative Veto, 1983 Sup.
CT. REV. 125 (P. Kurland, G. Casper & D. Hutchinson eds. 1984); Strauss, Was There a
Baby in the Bathwater? A Comment on the Supreme Court's Legislative Veto Decision, 1983
DUKE L.J. 789. Professor Strauss also discusses Chadha in The Place of Agencies in Gov-
ernment: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 633-40
(1984).
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The Chadha Court's analysis featured the ritualistic invo-
cation of the truism that a measure's ingenuity, conven-
ience, or greater efficiency will not save it if it is otherwise
unconstitutional. 39 The Court then made plain, through
reference to the intention of the Constitution's drafters, that
the aim of the separation of powers doctrine was to avoid
the ultimate, if not direct or immediate, threat of despot-
ism4o and tyranny4' through "the exercise of unchecked
power" 42 in a way such as to jeopardize liberty. 43
This Article has no quarrel with these principles, or with
the result reached in Chadha. The point is merely that the
Court, in a way foreshadowing Bowsher v. Synar, was unable
to resist the temptation to, in effect, relive one of its finest
hours, the decision in the steel seizure case of Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,44 in which encroachment or an
arguable first step toward interbranch usurpation was
clearly at issue.
In Chadha, by way of contrast, it is at least possible to char-
acterize the common practice 45 of legislative veto drafting as
"defensive" in nature, or as "balance-preservative." Justice
White's dissent46 depicted a state of affairs which, if accu-
rate, would lead one to view the majority's approach as sim-
ply unresponsive and rhetorical. Without passing judgment
on the merits of Justice White's analysis, there is at least
some plausibility, not responsively addressed by the major-
ity, in Justice White's view that
without the legislative veto, Congress is faced with a Hobson's
choice: either to refrain from delegating the necessary au-
thority, leaving itself with a hopeless task of writing laws with
the requisite specificity to cover endless special circumstances
across the entire policy landscape, or in the alternative, to ab-
dicate its lawmaking function to the Executive Branch and in-
dependent agencies. 47
39 See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 952-53.
40 Id. at 949.
41 Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 135 (H. Lodge ed. 1888)).
42 Id. at 966 (Powell, J., concurring).
43 Id. at 950.
44 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
45 Justice White referred to "nearly 200" legislative veto provisions in a wide vari-
ety of statutes drafted over the preceding half-century. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 968
(White, J., dissenting).
46 See generally id. at 967-1003 (White, J., dissenting).
47 Id. at 968 (White, J., dissenting).
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On Justice White's understanding, then, the enactment of
legislative veto provisions had not amounted to the forging
of "a sword with which Congress has struck out to aggran-
dize itself at the expense of the other branches" 48 but an
attempt by Congress to play more than a merely initiatory
role in the function of the modern administrative state.
Whether Congress is in fact faced with the full severity of
the Hobson's choice posited by Justice White is doubtful, 49
but the inadequacy of the majority's response, in which the
view is attributed to Justice White that the legislative veto is
merely a useful invention,5o prefigures the Bowsher majority's
avoidance of a realistic approach in passing on the Gramm-
Rudman Act.
Similarly, one might easily argue, based on the cumula-
tion of considerations discussed below, that the primary
purpose of the Gramm-Rudman legislation itself was pre-
cisely "to assure that statutory law is made in the common
interest." 51 If so, the effect of Gramm-Rudman on the aims
or values underlying the separation of powers must have
been equivocal at worst. More realistically, as we shall see
below, there is no credible analysis on which Gramm-Rud-
man substantially threatened any of the significant purposes
or values underlying the separation of powers doctrine. In-
stead of invalidating the statute, the Court might have re-
sponded to the judicial challenge to Gramm-Rudman by
observing realistically that "[t]here is no conspiracy of
power-hungry men attempting to usurp our governmental
systems, and the reaction that is called for from us is not the
• . . denunciation of tyranny." 52
III. THE PRECISE NATURE OF THE BUDGET
DEFICIT PROBLEM
The continuing federal budget deficit may pose problems,
in light of our system of electoral politics in a modern wel-
fare state, that differ in nature if not in magnitude from
48 Id. at 974 (White, J., dissenting).
49 See, e.g., the proposals discussed in Levitas & Brand, Congressional Review of Execu-
tive and Agency Actions After Chadha: "The Son of Legislative Veto" Lives On, 72 GEO. L.J.
801 (1984).
50 See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 945.
51 See W. GWYN, supra note 20, at 127-28.
52 See M. VILE, supra note 15, at 11.
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those surmounted in the past. Or so the Congress that en-
acted Gramm-Rudman might reasonably have imagined.
Commentators have observed internationally "the failure
of national economies to grow as rapidly as government
commitments to spend money."53 As of 1984, the federal
budget deficit, measured as a percentage of gross national
product, has been estimated to be slightly higher in the
United States than in Japan or Germany, but substantially
less than in Italy or Ireland. 54 Whether such comparisons
suggest a relatively serious problem is of course disputa-
ble,55 but that is irrelevant for our purposes. Congress in-
disputably perceived a significant problem that, by its lights,
resisted remedy through ordinary democratic processes for
reasons discussed below.
The basic theory would begin with the commonplace
observation that the pressures to increase or decrease public
spending are not symmetrical over time. "During a reces-
sion there are pressures to increase public spending to stim-
ulate the economy and to meet increased welfare claims[561
with more people in need. Additional spending can bejusti-
fied in boom years with the argument 'After all, the money is
there.' "57
Circumstances begin to suggest that the deficit phenome-
non is not fully controllable: "Since our political conversion
to Keynsianism during the Kennedy administration, we have
been told that deficits today will stimulate the economy into
producing full-employment surpluses tomorrow. Only to-
morrow never seems to come." 58 More recent events have
suggested that tomorrow arrives no sooner, and may even
53 R. ROSE & G. PETERS, CAN GOVERNMENT Go BANKRUPT? 6 (1978).
54 See Wilson, supra note 16, at 45.
55 See, e.g., B. HOGWOOD & G. PETERS, THE PATHOLOGY OF PUBLIC POLICY 101-18
(1985) (discussing the complexities in any overall normative judgment that a govern-
ment is, in this respect, "gluttonous" or "obese").
56 But cf. R. HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 87-88, 123 (1982) (arguing that the in-
creasingly broad scope of governmental action may tend disproportionately to bene-
fit the middle class and relatively well-off).
57 R. ROSE & G. PETERS, supra note 53, at 62. See also J. BUCHANAN & R. WAGNER,
DEMOCRACY IN DEFICIT: THE POLITICAL LEGACY OF LORD KEYNES (1977). For a dis-
cussion of various possible explanations for the expansion over time of public sector
spending, see Cameron, The Expansion of the Public Economy: A Comparative Analysis, 72
AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1243 (1978).
58 J. BUCHANAN & R. WAGNER, supra note 57, at 158. See also Wagner, Economic
Manipulation for Political Profit: Macroeconomic Consequences and Constitutional Implications,
30 KYKLOS 395, 408 (1977).
[Vol. 18:69
WOULD MADISON HAVE UNTIED ULYSSES?
recede, when fiscal policy is influenced by those in greater
intellectual sympathy with Arthur Laffer than with Lord
Keynes.
There may well be a potential conflict in the context of
political macroeconomy between what citizens want as indi-
viduals and what they want collectively. 59 While citizens
may enjoy, or demand, the public benefits provided through
growth or increased government spending, they have not
correspondingly accepted the necessary reduction in take-
home pay in the form of higher taxes. As individuals, it may
also be true that "[t]he fact that citizens are not charged
individually for each bit of 'jam' they secure from govern-
ment gives each an incentive to seek more." 60 It has even
been suggested, though it is certainly not necessary to the
argument, that voter demands for increased government
spending irrationally discount future serious6t economic
consequences .62
The problem is not merely one of narrow ideological per-
spective. Two leading public policy analysts have observed,
Regardless of one's position on fiscal probity and Keynsian
economics, the ease with which deficits can occur is a cause of
concern, and is indicative of the ease of public spending in the
absence of a revenue constraint. Spending is always easier po-
litically than raising revenue and the separating of the two
processes eliminates a major constraint on the joy of
spending. 63
When stated a bit more technically, but to similar effect,
the theory is that "[fliscal institutional structures allow in-
tergenerational wealth transfers and the rivalry for electoral
support, combined with the limited-liability nature of the
contract between politicians and voters suggest that politi-
cians have incentives to finance the output of the public sec-
tor with methods that will not yield budgetary balance."64
59 See R. RoSE & G. PETERS, supra note 53, at 12.
60 Id. at 105.
61 It has been observed that "even if a nation's citizens continue to support an
economically incompetent government, foreigners can effectively vote their lack of
confidence by selling its currency short in the international money market." R. ROSE
& G. PETERS, supra note 53, at 10.
62 See Brittan, The Economic Contradictions of Democracy, 5 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 129
(1975).
63 B. HOGWOOD & G. PETERS, supra note 55, at 130.
64 Crain & Ekelund, Deficits and Democracy, 44 S. EcON. J. 813, 827 (1978).
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Most recently, the inherent "trap" or paradox involved
was formulated in the following terms:
Even if the effects of public-debt issue are recognized by all
members of the polity ... the shortened time horizon in poli-
tics 1651 will make this financing option preferable to taxation
over some initial ranges of outlay unless there are constitu-
tional[66 or moral prohibitions on debt issue. By borrowing
the funds with which to finance currently enjoyed "goods,"
the participant is postponing the day of payment. 67
Crucially, merely knowing and understanding the nature of
the political problem of the public budget deficit does not
itself ensure its resolution. Voters and members of Con-
gress alike can recognize, for example, that any current-pe-
riod fiscal prudence is a fragile achievement and may be
utterly undone if the architects of current fiscal prudence
are electorally "outbid" by later less temperate political
coalitions.
As a result, on the analysis we are constructively attribut-
ing to Congress, "[t]here is simply no rational basis for an
individual to support, to 'vote for,' fiscal prudence in the op-
eration of democratic politics."68 At this juncture, it seems
utterly inadequate to respond with platitudinous references
to past crises surmounted by the Republic and injunctions
to courage, calm, and respect for the functioning of three
separate branches of government operating within their as-
signed spheres in the face of recurring tyrannical ambition.
If the path of tax increases sufficient to cover spending
increases seems blocked, a solution through spending re-
65 A member of Congress may reasonably fear receiving insufficient credit
electorally for measures that impose short-term pain in order to avoid massively
larger pain at some later time. He may similarly expect excessive credit for measures
that appear to work over only a short term, with the piper presenting his bill only at
some later date.
66 Presumably, the Gramm-Rudman statute itself could count as such a "constitu-
tional" rule, in that it would hierarchically control the effects of other spending stat-
utes. See infra text accompanying notes 91-93.
67 G. BRENNAN &J. BUCHANAN, THE REASON OF RULES 93 (1986) (emphasis in the
original).
68 Id. at 94. See also Ceaser, In Defense of Separation of Powers, in SEPARATION OF POW-
ERS: DOES IT STILL WORK? 168, 188-89 (R. Goldwin & A. Kaufman eds. 1986) (" 'Be-
cause so many are making claims, the claim of no single group can make much
difference to the level of public expenditure. Self-restraint by a particular group,
therefore, would bring no discernible benefit to it or any other group.' " (quoting S.
BEER, BRITAIN AGAINST ITSELF 24-33 (1982)).
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ductions may be no more promising. "In practice, few poli-
ticians wish to take away specific benefits, for the recipients
will protest their loss."69 More precisely, those beneficiaries
will tend to protest the loss more readily, more vigorously,
and more efficaciously than the politician will be rewarded
by the broad, diffuse mass of voters who derive a minimal
net benefit from the politician's decision. 7°
Worse, there is a moral tendency, to some degree per-
verse in its effects, for politicians and the electorate to be-
lieve that to initiate a spending program is to practically
bind future governments to continue it.7' The government
may be only the government of the day, but its expenditure
programs may tend toward immortality. This tendency is in
part based on a respectable "reliance interest" assertable by
the program's beneficiaries. In major spending areas, how-
ever, such as social security, the widespread public percep-
tion that any reduction, or even any failure to regularly
increase, retirement benefits would deprive the contributor
of a portion of her actual past contribution is largely
erroneous.72
As a result, past commitments to spend money in the fu-
ture, whether legally binding or not, tend to overload the
government's capacities to cover such spending through the
increased tax resources made available through economic
growth.73 It has been wryly observed that the bread and cir-
cuses provided by ancient Rome were fiscally superior in
this regard, in that they could be regarded as one-time, or at
most irregular, charges on the public fisc. Such practices
permit a degree of expenditure flexibility not enjoyed by the
modern administrative state, in which to spend once is to
create a presumption of permanency.74 The process is,
moreover, self-exacerbating: "new spending pledges must
be made in the next campaign as past ones are buried in the
69 R. ROSE & G. PETERS, supra note 53, at 26.
70 See generally the classic treatment of the costs of organization in M. OLSON,
THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).
71 See B. HOGWOOD & G. PETERS, supra note 55, at 123.
72 It has been estimated that "[i]f social security systems were like private insur-
ance companies and could not draw upon general tax revenues, benefits would have
to be cut by up to one-third in major Western nations." R. ROSE & G. PETERS, supra
note 53, at 90.
73 Id. at 9.
74 Id. at 113.
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ongoing costs of government."7 5
The electoral value of a dollar of continuing spending is
thus less than that of a dollar of "new" spending. But the
dollars of continuing spending do not thereby become read-
ily trimmable. It remains true that
[p]oliticians appear to believe that by targeting specific bene-
fits at particular pressure groups and blocs of voters they will
improve their popular standing. To identify the programs to
be repealed in order to permit a tax cut would stir up intense
opposition among those faced with a loss, without activating
support from those who might gain a very little from the cut.76
Recognition of such apparently intractable binds under
our democratic electoral system in an administrative state
has generated grave concern. At the extreme, it has been
argued that "democratic societies, as they now operate, will
self-destruct, perhaps slowly but nonetheless surely, unless
the rules of the political game are changed." 77
But whether self-destruction is the inevitable result or
not, there is a tenable view that "something other than ordi-
nary politics will be required to generate fiscal . . .disci-
pline." 78 On this theory, it follows that elected politicians,
as long as they remain responsive to the wishes of the elec-
torate or the bureaucracy, "need something by way of an
external and 'superior' rule that will allow them to forestall
the persistent demands for an increased flow of public-
spending benefits along with reduced levels of taxation." 79
Gramm-Rudman, if not perhaps a fully "external" rule, and
even if not clearly a "superior" rule, was an at least intuitive
attempt to devise and implement a congressional strategy to
address the paradoxes discussed in this section.
IV. CONGRESS AND THE DEFICIT: ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS
At one point in his Odyssey, Ulysses was confronted with
a conflict between his present, "settled," long-term, consid-
ered preferences not to die prematurely, and his predicted
preferences at a later, more stressful time, to take action
75 Id.
76 Id. at 112.
77 G. BRENNAN &J. BUCHANAN, supra note 67, at 7.
78 Id.
79 J. BUCHANAN & R. WAGNER, supra note 57, at 175.
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which would have forfeited his life based only on short-term
motivations.80 Based on these considerations, Ulysses chose
to give controlling weight to the values or preferences of his
present self as opposed to those of his predictable future
self.
More recently, Professor Sunstein has, without endorsing
the practical efficacy or constitutional legitimacy of a device
like Gramm-Rudman, referred explicitly to laws "calling for
a balanced budget" as an example of "voluntary foreclosure
of consumption choices" or the political analogue of Ulysses
and the Sirens.8 1 Whether Gramm-Rudman in particular
genuinely involved the actual preclusion of otherwise avail-
able options, in the same sense in which Ulysses' prepara-
tions practically barred his succumbing to the later
temptation of the Sirens' song, is doubtful at best.
Professor Sunstein's analysis nonetheless invites us to
consider Gramm-Rudman as at least of the generic class of
acts analyzable partially as "an effort by the publi[ 821 to pro-
tect itself against its own misguided [future] choices."8 3
Congress might reasonably have so intended Gramm-Rud-
man, in light of the logical constraints posed by the deficit
problem discussed in the previous section. Perhaps, in the
absence of a conclusive demonstration either way, Gramm-
Rudman might have served as a mechanism for resolving
the paradoxes of federal deficit spending noted above. Un-
fortunately, the Bowsher Court felt it appropriate to resolve
the separation of powers issues without considering explic-
itly the purposes of separation of powers doctrine, or the
nature, as opposed to the magnitude, of the deficit-creation
problem. As well, the Court failed to consider Gramm-Rud-
man as responsive, after the fashion of Ulysses' techniques,
to the precise nature of the deficit problem.
There are of course certain benefits to be derived from
ignoring any potential analogy between Ulysses' solution
and Gramm-Rudman, including the simplicity and reassur-
80 See, e.g., T. SCHELLING, CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE 57 (1984) (quoting Richard
Lattimore's translation of Homer's more poetic recounting of the preparations of
Ulysses, including the judicious use of ropes and earplugs, to safely navigate past the
tempting Sirens, in view of his predictable "future self's" future self-destructive
impulses).
81 See Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129,
1140 (1986) (citingJ. ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS (1984)).
82 Or by Congress and the public, presumably.
83 Sunstein, supra note 81, at 1141.
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ing familiarity of the judicial opinion. But the class of iden-
tifiable "Ulysses" problems is substantial, and the problems
range from the trivial to the vital. Among the less earth-
shaking would be self-restraint problems addressed by such
institutions as a bank's "Christmas Club" accounts which,
perhaps even in exchange for slightly lower interest rates,
create "ceremonial barriers to protect your account from
yourself."8 4
Of perhaps greater importance, if less resonantly fiscal in
its overtones, is the problem posed by the philosopher
David Pears. Pears refers to the case of a driver who "goes
to a party and... judges it best to stop at two drinks in spite
of the pleasure to be had from more, because there is no-
body else to take the wheel on the way home. Nevertheless,
when he is offered a third drink, ... he takes it."85 Such a
problem, which admittedly may involve complications of im-
paired rationality or diminished rational capacity over time,
invites a range of "Ulysses" solutions to a practical problem
of self-command over time.86
Serious "Ulysses" problems may also be drawn from the
public realm. For example, an American President might
believe, in moments of reflective tranquility, that not negoti-
ating with terrorist kidnappers and hostage-holders is, all
things considered, clearly the best policy. Yet the President
may in fact tend, regularly, to choose to listen to the Sirens'
song, and in fact negotiate, when the moment of truth
comes.
Similarly, in the case of Gramm-Rudman, elected officials
may perceive some need to be able to point to some alleg-
edly "automatic" mechanism at some remove, such as
Gramm-Rudman, to defuse constituency or interest group
complaints over reductions in favored spending programs.
This might well be so regardless of the elected officials' own
disposition toward reducing spending "on the merits."
There may be at least some loose analogy to the report that
at one point, "Florida hotel owners were... needful of fed-
eral coercion to integrate [regardless of their actual prefer-
ences], to avoid being accused of doing it voluntarily and
84 See T. SCHELLING, supra note 80, at 57-58.
85 D. PEARS, MOTIVATED IRRATIONALITY 12-13 (1984).
86 For a dramatic potential solution to such a practical problem, see T. SCHELLING,
supra note 80, at 102.
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subjecting themselves to reprisal."87
Such strategies can work, of course, only if the officials are
able, notwithstanding their ultimate accountability, to effec-
tively distance themselves from the politically unattractive
decision. This requirement suggests that in the Gramm-
Rudman context, the actual likelihood of Congress' attempt-
ing to intimidate or manipulate the Comptroller General
into making, or not making, particular, identifiable budget
cuts was minimal.88 It is instead reasonable to assume that
Congress' motive in enacting Gramm-Rudman was partially
to protect itself from direct, obvious association with the fi-
nal budget cuts at least nominally made by the Comptroller
General, if under congressional guidance. Such "interfer-
ence" would self-defeatingly reintroduce Congress into the
logical-political trap from which it was seeking to extricate
itself through Gramm-Rudman in the first place. The
Supreme Court took a step beyond formalism in inquiring
into the real breadth of the range of causes for which the
Comptroller General could be removed,8 9 but it did not
consider the strong "intrinsic deterrent" from doing so.
V. THE ACADEMIC CRITIQUE OF GRAMM-RUDMAN
Writing prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Bowsher
v. Synar, Professor Kahn observed that in Gramm-Rudman,
Congress has set a rule for itself-incur no deficit beyond the
stipulated maximum-and to enforce it has adopted a strategy
for dealing with violations that sets a penalty-the automatic,
across-the-board spending reduction-which is both unattrac-
tive and simultaneously keeps the enterprise of deficit reduc-
tion from collapsing.90
While this may seem unobjectionable constitutionally, if un-
usual, Professor Kahn concludes that Gramm-Rudman
amounts to "the attempt of one Congress to constrain fu-
ture Congresses."' 9 The Act "purports to regulate directly
and unavoidably, in the absence of repeal, the legislative
87 Id. at 196.
88 Cf. Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3191.
89 Compare id. with Wilson, supra note 16, at 38 (calling the Court's analysis on this
point into question on its own terms).
90 Kahn, Gramm-Rudman and the Capacity of Congress to Control the Future, 13 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 185, 187 (1986).
91 Id. at 185.
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product of a future Congress," 92 with the result that "[a]
present Congress is stipulating limits on what that future
Congress can do in the absence of a repeal." 93
Professor Kahn's primary objection is thus not to a classic
separation of powers infringement by one branch on the
turf of a different, coordinate branch of government. 94
Rather, he suggests that
the intent to control is appropriate only within a structure of
hierarchy, but .. .the relationship between past and future
Congresses is not that of superior to subordinate legislative
authorities. The kind of control of the legislative function that
Gramm-Rudman intends can only be accomplished constitu-
tionally through the amendment process, not by statute. 95
We often approve of Ulysses-type restraints, however, in
the absence of a clear hierarchical relationship of superior
and subordinate. If, for example, person A is a dieter, or a
cigarette smoker, we might reasonably and morally agree to
A's request at time T, that we now take and later withhold,
at time T2, the chocolate eclair or cigarettes that A spurns at
TI, but desperately covets at T2. Our cooperation in refus-
ing A's predictable change of mind at T2 does not seem to
rely on a strong assumption that A at T2 is simply a hierar-
chically subordinate person with respect to A at TI. We
92 Id. at 188.
93 Id. at 190. For another response to Professor Kahn, see Popkin, Legislative Self-
Constraint: A Reply to Professor Kahn, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q 205 (1987). See also
Chemerinsky, A Paradox Without A Principle: A Comment on the Burger Court'sJurisprudence
in Separation of Powers Cases, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1108-09 & 1108 n.102 (1987)
(briefly making a similar point).
94 Similarly, the central focus of Congressman Jack Brooks' article, Brooks,
Gramm-Rudman: Can Congress and the President Pass This Buck?, 64 TEX. L. REV. 131
(1985), is not on a traditional separation of powers inquiry, but on the view, ulti-
mately not accepted in either the District Court or Supreme Court opinions in Bow-
sher, that Gramm-Rudman should be struck down as an attempt by Congress to evade
its constitutionally imposed legislative responsibilities, contrary to at least a broad
view of the legislative nondelegation doctrine. Id. at 132-33. Cf. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388
(1935) (the two classic nondelegation cases, narrowly conceived, with an emphasis on
the "standardlessness" of the delegation at issue). See also Young, Some Reflections on
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, 45 MD. L. REV. 1, 8-12 (1986). Of course, an "evasion" of
responsibility by a branch of government, or a voluntary forfeiture of authority, if
such characterized the Congress' actions in enacting Gramm-Rudman, would stand
on its head the traditional separation of powers concern for constraining potentially
tyrannical ambition.
95 Kahn, supra note 90, at 187-88.
[Vol. 18:69
WOULD MADISON HA VE UNTIED ULYSSES?
simply are more convinced by A's arguments at TI than at
T2, partially in light of the overall circumstances.
Arguably, though, we have underplayed the difference in
identity, or continuity, between predecessor and successor
Congresses, particularly as opposed to the presumed con-
tinuity of identity of a single person, even over a period of
time.96 Congress is a continuing body, but its constituent
members, and basic views, and its very identity, might be
thought to change over time, or at least after elections, in a
way arguably different from change "within" a single human
being.
This may be, but it is important to remember that unlike
Ulysses, or the cigarette smoker, or the dieter, Congress
may be at least privately delighted with the effects of
Gramm-Rudman at both TI and, as a successor or later
Congress, at T2. Similarly, the electorate, 97 to whom both
Congresses may feel something of an agency obligation at
both TI and T2, may approve of the effects of Gramm-Rud-
man at both TI and T2.
As well, the degree of legal difficulty in a future Congress'
overriding the Gramm-Rudman constraint seems relevant.
Professor Kahn recognizes that Gramm-Rudman was sub-
ject to a simple repeal mechanism. 98 While the difficulty of
repeal is not to be underestimated, Gramm-Rudman in-
volved no practical impossibilities in a change of congres-
sional heart. Ulysses was himself bound more tightly and
irrevocably. If Congress feels practically bound to adhere to
Gramm-Rudman, contrary to its present will, such a feeling
may proceed less from a recognition of the mechanical diffi-
culty of repeal than from a fear that such an action might
reasonably be criticized by outsiders as a repellant display of
cravenness and lack of fortitude.
In the absence of any indication that the likely effects of
Gramm-Rudman would have been both horribly misguided
and irreversible, the objections raised to Gramm-Rudman
by Professor Kahn seem insufficiently disturbing. There is
even a certain practical irony in objecting, as Professor Kahn
does, to the actions of one Congress in binding or imposing
96 For some of the possible complications, see generally THE IDENTITIES OF PER-
SONS (A. Rorty ed. 1976).
97 We may safely set aside problems of discontinuity over time in the identity of a
continuing electorate.
98 See e.g., Kahn, supra note 90, at 188, 190.
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limits on what a future Congress can do, with or without the
possibility of repeal. Part of the impetus for Gramm-Rud-
man lies in the recognition that a Congress can effectively
and conclusively bind a successor Congress, at least as effec-
tively as would Gramm-Rudman, to continuing spending
programs. A system such as Social Security, for example,
creates reliance interests, a devoted, electorally potent con-
stituency, and an appetite for additional funding.99 Such
systems may be impervious to significant spending reduc-
tions, and need not balance expenditures and receipts at any
given particular time. A mechanism like Gramm-Rudman, if
it works tolerably well, unbinds future Congresses at least as
much as it binds them. 00
VI. CONGRESSIONAL MOTIVATION AND THE NON-
DELEGATION DOCTRINE
The Bowsher Court declined' 01 an opportunity to pre-
clude, in dicta, future separation of powers challenges to the
constitutional status of the so-called "independent" agen-
cies, whose chiefs do not sit at the pleasure of the President,
despite the language of Article II that "[t]he executive
Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America."102 The Court's scholasticism in resolving Bowsher
v. Synar does not bode well for the chances of any future
separation of powers attack on the legitimacy of independ-
ent agencies being resolved on the basis of an appropriate
combination of traditionalism, historicism, formal analysis,
functionalism, and realism.
Similarly, the Court's implicit assumptions as to congres-
sional motivation in enacting Gramm-Rudman do not bode
well for a satisfactory resolution of separation of powers
99 See generally J. BUCHANAN & R. WAGNER, supra note 57; R. ROSE & G. PETERS,
supra note 53.
100 Professor Kahn's view is based partially on his assumption that it is the logic of
Gramm-Rudman "that in a future Congress there is likely simultaneously to be a
majority in favor of spending more than the target deficits and yet no majority in
favor of repealing Gramm-Rudman." Kahn, supra note 90, at 204. But to at least
some extent, Gramm-Rudman need not be interpreted so as to dictate a particular
choice between two predicted future majorities. Congress, now and later, may sim-
ply feel that Gramm-Rudman is useful in that there is no obvious, nonarbitrary way of
determining which particular bit of expenditure by Congress will be the one to ex-
ceed even a unanimously agreed-upon deficit ceiling.
101 See Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3188 n.4.
102 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. See also Verkuil, The Status of Independent Agencies
After Bowsher v. Synar, 1986 DUKE L.J. 779.
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challenges to administrative regulations under the nondele-
gation doctrine. Under the nondelegation doctrine, Con-
gress is constitutionally entrusted with the legislative power.
Congress is forbidden to delegate legislative authority to ad-
ministrative agencies, especially on matters of primary or
fundamental importance, unless Congress imposes an intel-
ligible guiding principle or adequate substantive standards
to constrain the agencies' discretion.
The nondelegation doctrine reached its historical zenith
in 1935 in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States'03 and
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan.10 4 It has not subsequently had
much dramatic impact on the case law, but the revival of the
nondelegation doctrine has recently loomed,10 5 and a sub-
stantial body of scholarship finds the doctrine, under one
formulation or another, to be meritorious.106
In Panama Refining, the Congress had statutorily107 dele-
gated to the President the power to prohibit the interstate
transportation of "hot oil," or petroleum produced or with-
drawn from storage in amounts in excess of those permitted
under state law,108 upon pain of criminal fine or imprison-
ment. 10 9 The Panama Refining Company sued to restrain
the enforcement of several regulations promulgated under
the statutory delegation,1 0 alleging, among other grounds,
an unconstitutional delegation by Congress of legislative
103 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
104 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
105 See, e.g., American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448
U.S. 607, 671 (1980) (Rehnquist,J., concurring).
106 See, e.g., T. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM (2d ed. 1979); Aranson, Gellhorn &
Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1982); McGowan,
Congress, Court, and Control of Delegated Power, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1119 (1977); Schoen-
brod, Separation of Powers and the Powers That Be: The Constitutional Purposes of the Delega-
tion Doctrine, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 355 (1987); Wright, Beyond Discretionary Justice, 81 YALE
L.J. 575 (1972). For a selection of views less favorably disposed toward reinvigora-
tion of the nondelegation doctrine, see J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NA-
TIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980); K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARYJUSTICE (1969), Mashaw,
Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81
(1985); Pierce, The Role of Constitutional and Political Theory in Administrative Law, 64
TEX. L. REV. 469 (1985); Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 323
(1987).
107 The crucial provision was section 9(c) of the National Industrial Recovery Act
of June 16, 1933, 48 Stat. 195, 200 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 709(c)).
108 Panama Refining, 293 U.S. at 406.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 407-11.
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power to the President."'
The Supreme Court agreed. The Court held,
[T]here are limits of delegation which there is no constitu-
tional authority to transcend. We think that [the relevant stat-
utory provision] goes beyond those limits. As to the
transportation of oil production in excess of state permission,
the Congress has declared no policy, has established no stan-
dard, has laid down no rule. There is no requirement, no defi-
nition of circumstances and conditions in which the
transportation is to be allowed or prohibited.'12
Rather than approaching the issue of possible excess dele-
gation through a model of ambition or the seizure of power
by either Congress or the President, the Court instead
talked, in more realistic terms, of "abdication." The Court
recognized that Congress cannot reasonably be asked to
supply statutory direction beyond a certain measure of de-
tail in complex circumstances,"3 but declared that "[t]he
Congress manifestly is not permitted to abdicate, or to
transfer to others, the essential legislative functions with
which it is thus vested."'' 4
This language recurs nearly verbatim in Schechter Poul-
try. 1 5 The petitioners in Schechter Poultry were convicted of
criminal violations of the "Live Poultry Code" promulgated
by President Roosevelt pursuant to section three of the Na-
tional Industrial Recovery Act enacted by Congress." 6 The
petitioners contended, inter alia, that the Live Poultry Code,
which governed such matters as minimum wages and maxi-
mum hours within the industry," 7 had been adopted pursu-
ant to an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
authority. 1 18
The Supreme Court agreed. Referring to the crucial sec-
tion of the Act, the Court determined that
Il Id. at41.
112 Id. at 430. Justice Cardozo dissented, with his objections based less on broad
principle than on application. See id. at 433, 434-35 (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
I1 Id. at 421.
114 Id.
115 295 U.S. at 529.
116 National Industrial Recovery Act ofJune 16, 1933, 48 Stat. 195, 196 (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 703).
1 17 Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 524.
118 Id. at 519.
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[i]t supplies no standards for any trade, industry or activity. It
does not undertake to prescribe rules of conduct to be applied
to particular states of fact determined by appropriate adminis-
trative procedure. Instead of prescribing rules of conduct, it
authorizes the making of codes to prescribe them.... [T]he
discretion of the President in approving or prescribing codes,
and thus enacting laws for the government of trade and indus-
try throughout the country, is virtually unfettered." 19
The largely standardless code-making authority was there-
fore unconstitutional as an improper delegation of legisla-
tive power by Congress. 20 The Court noted, as it has in
virtually all of its separation of powers cases, that the exist-
ence of claimed or real emergencies cannot render other-
wise unconstitutional conduct permissible.121 It was able,
however, to resist the temptation to turn the case into an
encroachment or power-seeking case, using the language of"abdication"' 22 instead, as it did in Panama Refining.
The merits of nondelegation cannot be explored here.
More central to our purposes is the partial mismatch be-
tween the Court's preference for deciding separation of
powers issues under the congressional ambition or usurpa-
tion model, and some of the evident motives underlying the
congressional proclivity to delegate broad legislative au-
thority to agencies. It makes little sense for the courts to
adjudicate delegation cases on an explicit or implicit as-
sumption that a congressional power seizure model of the
separation of powers is relevant, if Congress is motivated
instead by a desire to voluntarily surrender substantial legis-
lative authority to the agencies, for the sake of other goals.
Congress has arguably legitimate reasons to consider del-
egating legal authority to administrative agencies.123 Less
attractive, though, are congressional desires to simply avoid
the risks of responsibility. On some current models, it is ar-
gued that "[b]y delegating both regulatory and legislative
119 Id. at 541-42.
120 See id. at 542. Justice Cardozo, who had dissented in Panama Refining, con-
curred in Schechter Poultry, analyzing the putative delegation as "not confined to any
single act nor to any class or group of acts identified or described by reference to a
standard. Here in effect is a roving commission to inquire into evils and upon discov-
ery correct them." Id. at 551 (Cardozo, J., concurring).
121 Id. at 528-29.
122 Id. at 529.
123 See, e.g., Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 106, at 21, 25; Pierce, supra
note 106, at 490-91.
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authority to the agencies, members of Congress currently
shift the cost of settling political conflicts while retaining
some of the political benefits of having acted."124 Massive
legislative delegation, while economizing on congressional
time and effort, allows Congress to enact an enormous vol-
ume of nominal legislation "that promise[s] all things to all
people."'' 25 Numerous conflicting goals and interests can be
represented in the vague, general statute, with the "resolu-
tion" amounting only to statutory language encouraging an
agency to pursue all such conflicting aims "to the extent
practicable."
In the words of one commentator, "[t]he legislator can
then come home claiming victory. When the constituents
become frustrated later, the legislator can blame 'those
damned bureaucrats.' This is . . . a political form of 'bait
and switch' advertising."'' 26 Of course, some interests will
be pleased with the outcome at the agency level. Those who
are not may have been too politically weak to prevail at the
agency level, and they may similarly tend to be too weak to
exact electoral retribution from the congressman, even if
they blame him. If otherwise powerful potential losing in-
terests become threatening, the congressman may be able to
intervene with the agency on their behalf, extracting a nar-
rowly tailored concession for them without otherwise dis-
turbing the agency result. The rewards for this sort of"constituent service" may be substantial. 27
It is undoubtedly attractive to wield power, for its own
sake, or in the service of what one takes to be good ends.
However, each member of Congress must recognize trade-
offs between the clear exercise of power in controversial
ways and its effect on his re-electability. Enacting an ambig-
uous, nearly vacuous, or nearly self-contradictory statute, to
be sorted out at the agency level, may allow the members to
claim credit with interest groups and with the broader elec-
torate, while deflecting at least some of the most intense
criticism and hostility. Hence, there is an incentive in many
cases for "a legislature fleeing from choice on critical
issues."1 28
124 Aranson, Gelihorn & Robinson, supra note 106, at 64.
125 See Schoenbrod, supra note 106, at 370.
126 Id. at 373.
127 See, e.g., the sources discussed in Pierce, supra note 106, at 491 & nn.127-29.
128 Mashaw, supra note 106, at 84 (referring to the arguments of others).
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This is not to suggest that the avoidance-of-responsibility
model is itself a sufficient and thoroughly satisfying empiri-
cal description of congressional behavior. 29 But, equally
plainly, it should not be ignored by the Court in appraising
the underlying realities of separation of powers issues based
on the nondelegation doctrine. To focus exclusively on the
presence or absence of impermissible congressional "en-
croachment,"130 or even on alleged "encroachment" by ad-
ministrative agencies on congressional turf, is to get the
matter largely backward.
CONCLUSION
This paper has not sought to conclusively establish the
empirical claims underlying the logic that resulted in
Gramm-Rudman. No claim is made here that Gramm-Rud-
man would have worked with crisp precision, even in the ab-
sence of a congressional override. It has been rightly
observed that "[g]overnments encounter great difficulties in
predicting their revenues and expenditures from year to
year. Both sides of the budgetary equation depend upon
too many factors to be predicted accurately."'' Nor can it
be claimed that Gramm-Rudman would have worked more
effectively than any imaginable alternative techniques.132
But these inevitable qualifications hardly constitute an ar-
gument for the long-term collective rationality, or the con-
trollability, of the present state of affairs in budgetary
matters. Neither do injunctions to political bravery 33 on
the part of Congress and the President seem responsive to
the nature of the budgetary paradoxes outlined above. Sim-
129 See generally Mashaw, supra note 106, for a critique of the Aranson-Gellhorn-
Robinson model.
130 Cf Stewart, supra note 106, at 324. "In Chadha and Synar, the Court developed
workable and defensible tests for identifying constitutionally impermissible congres-
sional encroachments on executive powers." Id.
131 B. HOGWOOD & G. PETERS, supra note 55, at 130 (citations omitted).
132 As Professor Schelling points out, having bound Odysseus himself in place,
"Odysseus' sailors could just as well have put the wax in their own ears." T. SCHEL-
LING, supra note 80, at 66. The most radical alternative technique, of course, would
be a constitutional convention. As to this prospect, see Elliott, Constitutional Conven-
tions and the Deficit, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1077.
133 Professor Schelling reports "expressions of concern that struggle builds char-
acter and the merchandising of'instant self-control' will weaken the human spirit. I
acknowledge the possibility, but cannot help comparing the argument to a similar
argument we used to hear against taking the pain out of childbirth." T. SCHELLING,
supra note 80, at 105.
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ilarly unresponsive are judicial opinions that emphasize
scholastic categorization of persons and functions as execu-
tive or legislative in nature, and that either ignore the aims
and purposes of the separation of powers doctrine, or as-
sume that ambition and potential tyranny must underlie in-
stitutional innovation and experimentation.
